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RENT REGULATION UNDER THE POLICE POWER
ONDITIONS resulting from the widespread housing shortage

caused
the cessation of building during the war have given
C
rise to legislation which must seem startling indeed to much of, the
by

legal talent surviving from a generation ago. The outstancfmg
example is to be found in the New York laws which so far have
succeeded admirably in eluding the constitutional pitfalls relied
upon to nullify them. Three provisions have borne the brunt of
the attack. The first prevents the recovery of an wireasonable rent
in an action at law, and places the burden of showing reasonableness upon the landlord.1 Another suspends for two years the landlord's right to maintain summary proceedings for dispossession
except in four instances. 2 These are: (a) where the tenant is
objectionable, (b where the landlord, befo~ a natural person,
desires the premises for his own personal use, ( c) where the land·
lord desires to construct a new building on the site of the qld one,
and ( d) where the building has been sold to a cooperativ~ apartment company. A third provision suspends the right to maintain
ejectment in the same manner. 8 In general, these provisions have
been sustained," but the last was decfared invalid by the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division of the First Department, in Guttag v.
Shatzkin,,,, chiefly on the ground that it impaired the obligation of
existing contracts in that it was the final enactment of the legislature culminating in the removal of ev~ry remedy, excepting in the
particular instances stated, of an owner for the recovery of the
possession of real property occupied by tenants whose terms had
expired and who were under contract ohl~gations e.."Cpressed in the

r

s C. 944 amending c. 136 of the April Laws.
• C. 942. Also c. 945 (unreasonableness a defense in action for summary ·
eviction for non-payment of rent).
•c. 947.
•Ullman Realty Co. v. Tamur, 185 N. Y. S. 612; Levy Leasing Co. v.
Siegel, 186 N. Y. S. S; People v. Fagan, 186 N. Y. S. 24; People v. La F.etra,
186 N. Y. S. 58; Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (D. C., S. D., N. Y., Dec.
15, J!)20),
'186 N. Y. S. 47 (Dec. 24, 1!)20).
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leases or implied' by" law to vacate the premises and surrender possession: thereof to their landlord.
The evils sought to be remedied are the charging of extortionate
rentals made possible by the shortage, coupled with the fact that
shelter is a necessity, and the impending wholesale evictions due to
the inability of thousands of families to pay increased rentals. 6 In
preventing the recovery of unreasonable rentals the legislature
might seem to have achieved all that is desired, inasmuch as the
landlord no longer has an object in exchanging one satisfactory
tenant for another. Practically, however, it is obvious that the
provision is futile so long as the landlord retains a menacing weapon
over the head of the tenant such as the possibility of eviction without shelter available elsewhere. The net result of the legislation is
to prevent the landlord from making an arbitrary change of tenants
from which he can derive no lawful gain. If he desires to continue
to use his property in the business of renting, and has a satisfactory
tenant paying a reasonable rental, he has all that he is entitled to.
This should be borne in mind throughout.
The chief constitutional objection, of course, is that the landlord
is deprived of his property without "due process.",, The answer is
that the business of renting houses is affected "with a public int<".rest,'' and therefore subject to regulation under the police power.
If the regulation of the housing business is a· proper exercise of
the police power, there remains the question of whether the means
adopted are reasonably related tO the end SOUght to be aCCOmplished.T
It is not proposed to enter into any extended discussion as to when
businesses or property may be said to be so affected, but it is submitted that the principle of Munn v. Illinois8 has been extended to
nothing more closely analogous than the business of furnishing
shelter to human beings. Whether the test applied is to be the
peculiar possibilities of the particular industry as an instrument of
oppression under existing economic conditions,0 or what amounts
1~

•Message of the Governor (Sept. 20, 1920); Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel,
N. Y. S. S; Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Housing, Sept.

20, 1920.

'Ullman Realty Co. v. Tamur, 185 N. Y:- S.
•Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S n3.
• 19 MxcH. L. ~v. 74.
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to the same thing, perhaps, whether the social interest is sufficiently
strong to counterbalance the interference with individual interests,1°
the business of renting seems a proper one for regulation. And the
means are clear~ reasonably related to the particular ends sought
to be accomplished, despite the objection that they do not add one
square foot tc> the supply of dwelling accommodations.u
A recent writer presents an interesting but, it is believed, au
unsound view as to the nature of the New York laws and the basis
on which they rest, or should be rested. 12 The theory advanced is
that an appeal to the police power is not only unnecessary but
improper. The provision preventing the recovery of an unreasonable rental is merely declaratory of an ancient power of courts of
equity not dependent on any statute, namely, the power to set aside
contracts shown to have been procured by duress. The provision
,suspending the right to maintain summary proceedings is justified
on the ground that there is no vested right in a statutory remedy,
and that the legislature can take it away altogether, if it so desires,
by virtue of its ordinary power to legislate without any reference
to police power. The provision suspending the right to maintain
ejectment is apparently abandoned as hopeless. The shortage,
together with the fact that housing is necessary, is relied upon as
constituting such duress as to make the lease voidable. It works
out thus : The landlord brings his action for the recovery of rent,
and the tenant interposes the equitable defense that the contract
was procured by duress. The contract is then set aside and the
landlord falls ,back upon the implied contract and recovers the reasonable value for use and occupation. The flaw in the theory seems
to be that there is no duress of the sort for which equity gives relief.
True, the doctrine of duress has been considerably extended and
some courts have used language indicating that all that is necessary
is that the freedom of will of the contracting party is overcome so
that there is no real meeting of minds.13 One element of the early
law still persists, however, and that is that the pressure must be
11

33 HARV. L. IU:v. 838.
Judge Blackmar (dissenting) in People v. Fagan, 186 N. Y. S. 24, 36
(Dec. '/. 1920).
11
"The New York Landlord and Tenant Laws," VI CoRN. L .. QUAllT. r .
.. IS MICH. L. REV. 228.
11
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wrongful, and it is not sufficient that a party is constrained to enter
into a transaction by force of circumstances for which the other
· party is not responsible.u This theory would take care of the objection that preexisting contracts are impaired, in rather neat fashion,
but the writer is led to an odd conclusion as to the validity of the
legislation if applied to subsequent contracts. He says that if it is
held to apply to these a premium is placed on fraudulent conduct
on the part of the tenant, in that he may accept any terms offered
by the landlord for the sake of remaining in possession, knowing
that the contract is presumptively void if the rent is higher than
that of the year previous .• It is rather difficult to perceive that any
1,Ulconscionable advantage is taken by the tenant under the circumstances. He also concludes that it is invalid if applied to subsequent leases as an unconstitutional interference with private property, ·because it prevents the landlord from leasing his property at
its market value. Obviously, this begs the whole question and is
scarcely consistent with the duress theory. The only possible basis
on which the legislation can be sustained would seem to be the
police pbwer of the state. 1 r;
Although the housing situation has resulted in a mass of legh:lation touching various aspects o~ it,18 there seems to have been almost
no litigation outside of New Y-0rk except in the District of Columbia. In May of 1918, Congress passed the Saulsbury resolution,11
which was held unconstitutional in Willson v. McDonnell,18 This
prohibited eviction so long as the tenant paid the rent and was
satisfactory, in effect prolonging existing leases for the duration of
the act. This was held invalid on the ground that as it affected
only existing leases it discriminated in favor of landlords whose
property was then unincumbered. The court refused to consider
the question as to whether or not the business of renting had become
Vol. III, pp. 2833, 2836.
The cases suggest no other basis. The situation has been said to be
such as ·to warrant the t'Xercise of the power of eminent domain. Ullman
Realty Co. v. Tamur, 185 N. Y. S. 612; Willson v. McDonnt'll, 265 Fed. 43:?.
Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 2n Mass. 624.
•See "Rent Regulation and the Housing Problem" in the Journal issutd
ht the American Bar Association, January, 1921.
ST 40 STAT. AT L. 593.
•Willson v. McDonnell, 265 Fed. "32.
,. WIU.ISTO.N ON CoNTRACTs,
8
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"affected with a public interest." In October,_ 1919, Congress
adopted the Ball Rent Law,19 which was held unconstitutional in
Hirsch v. Block.20 The provisions covered much the same ground
as the New York laws except that a rent commission was provided
for, with power to regulate rents and service, whereas what amounts
to regulation of rates in New York is left to the courts. A New
York case21 distinguishes the Ball law on the grounds that it was
wider in scope than the New York laws and took away the right
of trial by jury in actions to recover land in violation of the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution. WhateYer merit
there may be in such distinctions, it is clear that the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia would not uphold the New
York legislation nor any other. The court says in part:
"Plaintiff had a vested estate and a reversion in fee in the
property in question to come into pos~ession on January l,
1920. * * * The right of reversion is a property right of
which the plaintiff cannot be divested except by due process
of law. * * * Nor does this amount to the taking of private
property for public use. Plaintiff and defendant are private
citizens, engaged in a private business. * * * The power to
fix rental rates between private individuals is not analogous
to nor controlled by the decisions which' have upheld the
power of the legislature to fix rates for service where the
owner has devoted the business affected to a public use. * * **
In no case where the legislative power to fix rates has been
upheld has the power to continue existing contracts in force
after the time fixed by the partJes for their termination,' or
to require the owner of the property to continue the business
been sustained. * * * A public interest cannot be thus created, or property rights be divested, by an arbitrary exercise
of the police power."
Contrast with this the much-quoted recent opinion of Judge
"BAI.r.

RtN'l'_

I.Aw, 41

S'l'A'l'. AT

L. 298.

"Hirsch v. Block,~ Fed. 614- Cf. dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Smyth.
"'Ullman Realty Co. v. Tamur, 185 N. Y. S. 612.
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Baker in the case of the American Coal Mining Company v. The
Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana:~ 2
"Are the sovereign people helpless in such a situation?
(oppression by extortionate rates for fuel and housing made
possible by shortages). They certainly are if the Fourteenth
Amendment stopped the narrowing of these various circles
within which persons theretofore might move freely with
respect to life, liberty and property. But otherwise not. The
police power is continuous. It has always existed, and necessarily must always exist. And it is as wide as any conceivable sovereignty can ·be."
The District of Columbia court evidently became so engrossed
in a study of form that substance was completely ignored.
The obvious advantages of creating a rent conlmission to
regulate housing conditions generally, and particularly rates, led
to a proposed statute by Professor Wigmore in a recent article in
the l:t.J.INOIS LAW Ritvn~w. 11 Professor Wigmore rightly contends
that a court is a poor piece of machinery for rate-making, especially
since, theoretically, the effect of its decision must be confined to the
~se before it. The proposed statute applies only to future leases
and provides no remedy for the wholesale evictions against which
the New York laws have attempted to guard, other than to take
away any substantial reason the landlord might have for making a
change by limiting his return for the future to a reasonable amount.
The author makes three claims of superiority for his measure which
merit attention: First, that it is constitutional. This is conceded,
tne Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia notwithstanding.
But it is yet to be demonstrated that the New York legislation is
less meritorious in this respect. Second, that it is fair in that it
imposes no arbitrary rule; but enables discrimination to be made
between the grasping_ profiteer and the meritorious landlord. If
each gets what he is justly entitled to and no more-i. e., a reasonable re1'Jm-it is hard to see any possibility of such discrimination,
and .it is equally difficult to see how rentals could be regulated on
·~ Fed. s63 (Seift: 6, 192()).
•"A Coustitutiohal .Way to Reach the "Housing Profiteer," 15 Ir.r.. L.
REv. 359-
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any other basis. The third advantage, that a conunission is superior to throwing the whole burden on the courts, may be conceded.
Legislation which leaves the landlord able to dislodge a satisfactory
tenant, however, would scarcely seem sufficient to counterbalance
the obvious objections on the policy side to any and all regulation
which will be discussed later.
Aside from the taking of property without due process, there is
but one other constitutional objection to the New York legislation
which deserves mention, which is that preexisting contracts are
impaired in violation of the Federal Constitution. This contention
is supported in the February number of the HARVARD LAW REVIEW~"
and by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division of the First Department, in Guttag v. Schatzkin,2 5 previously referred to. This view
is believed to be untenable. It is said that in every case in which
the impairment of existing contracts has been held valid the explanation is to be found in the fact that the contract apparently impaired
has been that of a state purporting to bargain away a part of its
sovereignty, in which case the contract is void ab initio, or that of
a public utility in derogation of its cqmmon law duty to render a
reasonable service to all, which is at least voidable. But it is conceded that a general law which incidentally impairs the obligation
of private contracts is not for that reason invalid,.and a distinction
is attempted between such a law and the New York provisions on
the ground that the latter attack the contract directly by taking
away all remedies whereby the landlord can enforce the express or
implied contract in every lease to give up possession at the end of
the term. The primary purpose of the New York laws, however,
is to protect the individual, not for his sake but because of the legislative finding, as expressed in the law, that in so doing public
health, safety, and general welfare are best subserved.2 d If this is
conceded, the attempted distinction is meaningless, and the law is
clearly a general one which only incidentally impairs contract~
between individuals.
"This power, which in its various ramifications is- known
"34

HARV.

L. R.Ev. ¢.

• Guttag v. Schatzkin, 186 N. Y. S. 4;-.
•Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 186 N. Y. S. s; Decision by the Court of
Appeals, March g, 1921, reversing Guttag v. Schatzkin.
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as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of
the government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort,
and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any
rights under contracts between individuals. Familiar instances
of this are where parties enter into contracts, perfectly lawful at the time, to sell liquor, operate a brewery or distillery,
or carry on a lottery, all of which are subject to impairment
by a change of policy on the part of the state, prohibiting the
establishment or continuance of such traffic; in other words,
that parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good."~ 7
To the examples mentioned may be added the numerous cases
where cities have passed ordinances restricting buildings of various
sorts, sucb as frame houses, in particular districts. Preexisting
contracts are often impaired, but the ordinances are nevertheless
valid. 28 The principle underlying these cases is indistinguishable
from that which is applicable here. Why should contract rights he
more sacred, where public welfare is involved, than other property
rights? It is scarcely an answer to say that to hold othenvise is
"going counter to the plain words of the Constitution." In reversing Guttag v. Schatzkin, the Court of Appeals of New York, iri a
case decided since the foregoing was written, said :
"Laws directly nullifying some essential part of private
contracts are rare, and are not lightly to be upheld by heavy
and sweeping generalization on the common good, but no
decision upholds the extreme view that the obligation of private contracts may never be directly impaired in the exercise
of the legislative power."
·The real distinction would seem to be between laV?s passed for
the general welfare and those primarily for the benefit of one of

•

"Manigault v. Springs, 199 1T ,:;. 473.
Salem v. Maynes, 123 Mass: 312, Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea .(Tenn.)
~121; New York v. Ncrdje, 68 App. Div. 370; see also People v. Hawley, 3
Mich. 336; Re Ten-Hour Law for Street Ry. Corps. (R. I.), 54 Atl. 6o2;
Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquor,,us Mass. 153; Jamieson v. Indiana
Nat. Gas and Oil Co., 128 Ind. 555.
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the contracting parties.~ 9 The latter could never be justified as
police power, but the former cannot be handicapped by contracts
between individuals.
On March 7 an opinion was handed down by the Court of
Appeals sustaining the law on all points,30 and there would seem to
be no doubt as to the constitutionality of the entire program. Some
very serious questions of policy remain unsettled, however Nothing is more obvious than the fact that any restrictive legislation is
bound to drive capital out of the field and postpone the day when
the fundamental evil, the shortage, is remedied. 81 Accompanying
the newspaper report of the decision is the demand for repeal of
the laws by the real estate associatior s, and the assurance t~at there
will be no building while they remain in existence.3 :.: The choice
between immediate relief and the indefinite postponement of ultimate relief, unless the state itself goes into the building business,
is a most difficult one, and it remains to be seen whether the Ne·.v
York legislature has chosen wisely. The choice is for the legislature
alone, however, not for the courts.
Ar.AN W. BoYD.

University of Michigan

!~aw

• Fl!sUND ON POLlCS Po~,

School.

pp. 583, 584

11

New York Times, March 9, 1921.
111
'How to Meet the Housing Situation," An.ANTIC MONTHLY, March,
1921, p. 404; "Rent Regulation and the Housing Problem," from the Journal
issued by the American Bar Association., January, 1921.
12
New .York Times, March 9, 1921, p. 4-

